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Left–Islamist Opposition Cooperation
in Morocco
EVA WEGNER* and MIQUEL PELLICER**
ABSTRACT This contribution studies the different preferences of Moroccan
Islamists and leftists for cooperating with each other. The Islamist Party of Justice
and Development (PJD) has been actively seeking an alliance with the leftist
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) since 2007. The USFP’s national
leadership has avoided any form of cooperation with the Islamists at the national
level, but had to tolerate government coalitions at the local level. We find that the
most important driver behind the USFP’s reluctance to ally with the Islamists is its
co-optation. The asymmetry in electoral strength and differences in the type of
electoral support the two parties enjoy also appear to be important reasons behind
the different party preferences. For the PJD, its superior electoral support and the
higher degree of programmatic support it enjoys suggest that it expects to be
successful in democratic elections, while the opposite seems to be the case for the
USFP. Ideology, by contrast, was found to be of little importance in determining
the positions of the national PJD or USFP leadership towards cross-party
cooperation. The analysis is based on original field research conducted in
Morocco and on data from the World Values Survey.
Introduction
Opposition unity is often portrayed as important, or even as the ‘watershed’
moment, in democratisation processes. In turn, a divided opposition is
widely considered to be a key reason behind stalled democratisation processes,
as even unpopular rulers can stay in power by using patronage and repression
if no strong political alternative exists.1 Indeed, Morocco appears to be a
case in point. Since independence, Moroccan rulers have successfully employed
‘divide and rule’ tactics in dealing with the country’s political opposition,
*Southern Africa Labour & Development Research Unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3,
7701 Rondebosch, South Africa. E-mail: es.wegner@uct.ac.za
**School of Economics, University of Cape Town, South Africa. E-mail: miquel.pellicergallardo@uct.ac.za
1 N. Van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?’, in A. Schedler (ed.), Electoral
Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 77–92. Crook
and Osaghae, for instance, also blame stalled democratisation processes on a divided opposition. See R.C. Crook,
‘Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections
in Coˆte d’Ivoire’, African Affairs, 96(383) (1997), pp. 215–242; and E. Osaghae, ‘Democratization in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Faltering Prospects, New Hopes’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 17(1) (1999),
pp. 5–28.
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and have thereby survived periods of economic and social crises and even popular
protest.2
Since independence, efforts at opposition cooperation in Morocco have
revolved primarily around the leftist Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)
and the Istiqlal (independence) party. This (on and off) ‘alliance for
democratisation’ between the USFP and Istiqlal has often lacked cohesion at
key moments, however, and rivalries between party leaders have made them miss
relevant opportunities to drive forward political reform.3 The most significant
opportunity to push through important constitutional reforms occurred in the
1990s, when King Hassan II needed the two parties’ cooperation to increase his
reform credentials, and ultimately included them in the so-called alternance
government from 1998–2002. Although some of the opposition’s reform demands
had been implemented, the power of the monarchy to rule and to govern remained
untouched. In fact, the association between the USFP and Istiqlal continues to date
in government with no meaningful constitutional reforms on the agenda. Whilst
Istiqlal appears largely content with this situation, the USFP’s party base has
challenged the viability of remaining in powerless governments subjugated to a
ruling monarch.
Since 2007, the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), a relative
newcomer on the Moroccan party political scene, has been attempting to pursue
closer cooperation with the USFP. The Islamists’ desire for rapprochement with its
former foe arose from a re-evaluation of reform prospects in Morocco. For a
decade, the PJD had been focusing on achieving reforms through the ballot box.
Up to 2007, the party had been confident that it could gain sufficient electoral
strength to push through democratic reforms as the leader of a reform-oriented
government. Having failed to win the necessary seats in parliament in the 2007
elections, the party revised its approach towards elections and democratic reforms
in Morocco. Whereas the PJD had previously focused almost exclusively on the
electoral contest, seeing it as a vehicle for reforms from within, this perception
changed after its electoral ‘failure’. Party leaders increasingly perceived that
regime interference in electoral mobilisation, and in politics more generally, was
ultimately too strong to allow an opposition party to neglect extra-parliamentary
pressures for reform, that is, to play the ‘regime game’.4 In this context, the
Islamists approached the USFP, the party that they perceived as the only other
electorally relevant force in Morocco whose agenda includes calls for significant
democratic reforms. From the Islamists’ point of view, cooperation with the left,
for instance in the form of joint calls for constitutional reforms or protests against
2 See J. Waterbury. The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite. A Study of Segmented
Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970); I.W. Zartman, ‘Opposition as Support of the State’, in
A. Dawisha and I.W. Zartman (eds), Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State (London: Croom Helm,
1988), pp. 61–87; J.-C. Santucci, Les partis politiques marocains a` l’e´preuve du pouvoir. Analyse diachronique
et socio-politique d’un pluralisme sous controˆle (Rabat: REMALD Collections Manuels et Travaux
Universitaires, 2001); E. Lust-Okar, Structuring Contestation in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and
Institutions (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
3 The latest explicit pro-democracy alliance between Istiqlal and the USFP dates back to 1989, when the two
political parties formed Kutla al-Democratiyya (democratic block), which also included some smaller parties. In
1992, they published the ‘Memorandum’, which called for far-reaching constitutional reforms. For this and
previous cooperation between Istiqlal and the USFP, see L. Storm, Democratization in Morocco (London:
Routledge, 2007).
4 E. Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Moroccan Party of Justice and Development
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011).
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civil and political rights abuses, is mainly intended to embarrass the Moroccan
regime, which has hitherto been able to cultivate a relatively successful image as a
democratising regime while remaining inherently autocratic. The credibility of
this image at home, and of course abroad, depends strongly on the absence of a
strong opposition denouncing authoritarian rule in Morocco.5 Cooperation
between the most powerful leftist party and the largest legal Islamist force that
would take on autocratic rules and practices could thus put meaningful pressure on
the regime. As part of its drive to forge closer ties with the USFP, the PJD
leadership has promoted the formation of local government coalitions between the
PJD and the USFP, following the 2009 municipal elections.6
The USFP’s response to the PJD’s overtures has been mixed. While the national
party leadership has so far rejected any form of cooperation with the PJD, local
USFP councillors decided in 2009 to enter into governing coalitions with their PJD
counterparts in a number of towns across the country, both as senior and junior
partners. Thus forged against the will of the USFP leadership, these local
government coalitions also alerted the Moroccan regime which, weary of any
rapprochement between the two parties, has sought to prevent their
establishment.7
This contribution explores the position of the USFP and PJD leadership towards
cross-party cooperation. More precisely, it seeks to understand the difference in
their attitudes towards any such cooperation. Why have PJD leaders actively
sought to pursue closer cooperation with the USFP at the national level and
advanced the formation of local government coalitions between the two parties at
the local level? And why has the USFP leadership rejected PJD offers to cooperate
in any form, while local USFP activists forged local government coalitions with
the PJD after the 2009 elections? To answer these questions, this analysis will
proceed as follows. First, it provides some background on the two political parties
and examines how their views towards each other have evolved since the
emergence of the PJD on the electoral scene in the late 1990s. Second, it identifies
key factors influencing opposition cooperation from the literature on leftist–
Islamist cooperation that will serve as a heuristic tool for the study of USFP–PJD
cooperation in Morocco. These factors are: (1) ideological differences;
(2) expectations of electoral strength; and (3) regime strategies towards the
opposition in the form of co-optation and repression. Third, it explores to what
extent these factors can explain the differences in the USFP and PJD leadership’s
attitudes towards cross-party cooperation.
5 See E. Wegner, ‘Authoritarian King and Democratic Islamists in Morocco’, in D. Brumberg and M. Asseburg
(eds), The Challenge of Islamists for EU and US Policies: Conflict, Stability, and Reform (Washington & Berlin:
USIP/SWP, 2007), pp. 53–58.
6 In this contribution, cooperation will be used as the most abstract term to denote any form of joint activities of
Morocco’s political parties. Reform coalition will be used to denote the type of pro-democracy cooperation
sought by the PJD. The term coalition in turn will solely denote government coalitions either at the local or
national level.
7 A USFP councillor in such a local government coalition gave a detailed account of regime attempts to prevent
him from forming a coalition with the PJD. These attempts included calls and threats from the governor not only
to him—as the leader of the electoral list—but also to other councillors of his party, deemed more
‘impressionable’ and thus hoped to be incited to either leave the USFP or vote against the coalition. A first attempt
of voting the new USFP/PJD city government into office then failed as regime-incited or at least tolerated thugs
stormed the city hall and broke the ballot box. After this, the PJD and the USFP agreed on the need to bring the
Istiqlal party in—even if they did not need its votes—to secure a broader base for their coalition. As the USFP
councillor put it, ‘one cannot put pressure on everybody’. Authors’ interviews with PJD and USFP councillors,
28–29 June 2009.
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Overall, we find little evidence in support of the USFP leadership’s claim that it
objects to cooperation with the PJD on ideological grounds. Instead, we argue that
differences in USFP/PJD attitudes towards cooperation appear to be driven, first,
by differences in their respective electoral strength, with the PJD expecting to fare
well in democratic elections, while the electoral prospects of the USFP appear far
less certain. A second important factor is that the USFP would have to sacrifice its
current participation in national government and the related spoils of co-optation
for pro-democracy cooperation with the PJD. This also helps explain the
difference between the national and local leadership’s attitudes toward
cooperation, as the USFP’s activists on the ground have much less to gain from
clinging onto office in unpopular and unsuccessful municipal government
coalitions.
The analysis is based on two types of data. First, it draws on several in-depth
interviews conducted with USFP and PJD leaders, local activists and councillors
during field research in Morocco in 2007, 2008 and 2009. This qualitative
evidence is mainly used to trace the evolution of USFP/PJD attitudes towards
cross-party cooperation. Second, the analysis draws on quantitative data from the
2001/2002 and 2007 World Values Survey on the attitudes of USFP and PJD
supporters on gender roles and the role of religion in politics. The survey data are
used as a proxy for the ideological distance that exists between the two political
parties. Additionally, we draw on secondary sources to discuss differences in the
strength and type of the two parties’ electoral support.
USFP, PJD and Their Positions towards Cross-party Cooperation
The USFP’s metamorphosis: from opposition to government party
The USFP has metamorphosed over the past four decades from a party of the
opposition to a party of government. Until the mid-1970s, the USFP—then
operating under the name of the National Union of Popular Forces—stood in direct
opposition to a highly repressive regime and at the forefront of demands for
greater civil and political liberties.8 In these first two decades after independence,
the monarchy governed with the help of the military and a vast clientelist network.
It was only after the appropriation of the Western Sahara in 1975—providing
overwhelming public support to the monarchy and, in this way, making talks with
the opposition parties possible—that the USFP became more of a ‘loyal’
opposition. Whereas it explicitly forsook revolutionary ambitions, the party still
attempted to put pressure on the regime for broader political reforms.9 The party
tried to maintain a close alliance with Istiqlal to that effect, but was often betrayed
by the latter, for example after the 1977 elections when Istiqlal joined a
government of ‘national unity’ composed of regime-supportive parties.10
In the early 1990s, Istiqlal and the USFP renewed their efforts at cross-party
cooperation, forming a new alliance and publishing a common memorandum with
8 In the 1960s and early 1970s, UNFP leaders and activists were frequently arrested and tortured. In 1965, the
UNFP’s exiled leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, was kidnapped and assassinated in France. See Santucci, Les partis
politiques marocains a` l’e´preuve du pouvoir.
9 The USFP split from the UNFP over the issue of the degree of opposition to the regime. The more
revolutionary-minded activists, a small minority, remained within the UNFP.
10 A detailed analysis of the history of USFP–Istiqlal cooperation is beyond the scope of this contribution.
Further discussion of this alliance can be found in Storm, Democratization in Morocco.
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their reform demands, the most important of which called for the direct election of
all members of parliament.11 This demand, as well as demands for some other
constitutional reforms that upgraded the prerogatives of parliament, was finally
met by the regime in 1996.12 While effectively creating a much more liberal
political environment, these reforms did not constitute a substantial change of
power relations in Morocco, and the monarchy remained the most powerful
institution.13 An important part of the liberalisation process was the inclusion of
the opposition into the so-called alternance government of 1998 and the
appointment of then USFP leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi as Prime Minister
(1998–2002). While symbolically important, this and subsequent governments in
which the USFP took part have not achieved any significant further gains in
political reforms.14 The ensuing electoral decline faced by the USFP has generated
recurrent debates within the party about abandoning its cabinet positions and
returning to the opposition benches.15 To date, however, none of these debates has
had any consequences and it appears that the current USFP leadership remains
committed to its place in the Moroccan government.
The USFP’s position towards the PJD has been hostile ever since the latter first
participated in elections in 1997. Resentments further increased when the PJD
contributed to sabotaging an important social reform promoted by the USFP, the
reform of the personal status code in 1999 and, probably more importantly, when
the PJD performed very well in the parliamentary elections of 2002.16 Although
the USFP had still won eight seats more than the PJD, it had lost a total of seven
seats since the previous elections, while the PJD had gained another 33. The
USFP’s hostility towards the PJD became very clear after the terrorist attacks of 16
May 2003, for which the USFP tried to blame the PJD. In fact, USFP leader
Mohammed El-Yazghi demanded an apology from the PJD to the Moroccan
people, and accused it of complicity in the attacks.17 The USFP’s newspaper,
Libe´ration, ran a campaign against the PJD, with articles alleging the implication
of PJD activists in the attacks.18
11 Published in L’Opinion, 8 July 1992. Until 1997, one third of parliament was indirectly elected, serving as a
regime tool to ‘correct’ the results of direct elections.
12 Other political liberalisation measures introduced by the regime at the time included the release of political
prisoners and an increase in press freedoms. The 1996 constitutional reforms also introduced a new indirectly
elected upper house of parliament, with significant prerogatives and an essentially pro-regime composition to
balance the increased powers of the elected lower house of parliament.
13 A. Layachi, ‘Economic Reform and Elusive Political Change in Morocco’, in Y. Zoubir (ed.), North Africa in
Transition: State, Society and Economic Transformation in the 1990s (Gainesville: University Press of Florida,
1999), pp. 43–60.
14 All coalition governments since 1998 have included both the USFP and Istiqlal. For a critical assessment of the
alternance government, see for instance A. Hidass, ‘La liberte´ d’opinion et d’expression au Maroc: normes
contingentements et transition de´mocratique’, Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, 39 (2001), pp. 255–278; and J.-N.
Ferrie´, ‘Fin De Partie: L’e´chec politique de l’alternance et la transition prolonge´e’, Annuaire de l’Afrique du
Nord, 40 (2002), pp. 308–324.
15 Istiqlal, by contrast, has not faced a similar electoral decline. This is most likely due to the fact that, unlike the
USFP, Istiqlal has never been a strongly programmatic party but has had important support in the countryside. As
government participation has increased its patronage capabilities, it has probably contributed positively to its
electoral support.
16 The reform of the personal status code was ultimately implemented as a royal initiative in 2003, earning King
Mohamed VI a reputation as a social reformer in the West.
17 See Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes; and E. Wegner and M. Pellicer, ‘Islamist
Moderation without Democratization: The Coming of Age of the Moroccan Party of Justice and Development?’,
Democratization, 16(1) (2009), pp. 157–175.
18 These allegations appear to have been false as no PJD activist has ever been formally implicated in the attacks.
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Since 2003, however, the USFP has gradually changed its position towards the
PJD and considers it a legitimate Moroccan party.19 It argues that the PJD has
‘opened up’ and moderated its positions.20 Nevertheless, the USFP leadership has
so far declined to join forces with the PJD in any way at the national level,
although this decision is not entirely consensual.21
At the local level, there has been an even more profound change. After the
2003 municipal elections, the USFP national leadership explicitly forbade
its councillors to forge local government coalitions with the PJD.22 After the
2009 elections, by contrast, no explicit instructions were given by the USFP
leadership regarding local government coalitions in general, and coalitions
between the USFP and the PJD were in fact forged in several towns across the
country.23
The characteristics of the coalition-building process do, however, show that this
is not a change of the national leadership’s position towards cooperation with the
PJD. Most importantly, these local government coalitions were purely initiatives
by local activists, wanting to opt out of previous coalitions with other parties that
they viewed as unsuccessful—or disastrous—in their performance.24 The USFP
leadership considered these government coalitions an accident of the
decentralisation of decision-making regarding local government coalitions, not
as a conscious decision in favour of political cooperation with the PJD. Although
USFP leaders acknowledged that the two parties share some commonalities, for
instance in the fight against corruption and in their demands for political reforms,
they retained a strong preference for their local government coalitions to
comprise the same parties as the national government coalition, in particular the
National Rally of Independents (RNI) and Istiqlal.25 Drawing on a previous
party congress decision to decentralise government coalition-building at the local
level, however, the activists went ahead with their PJD coalitions. In sum, the
USFP’s current position is that it is against a pro-democracy alliance with the PJD
at the national level, but has to tolerate local cross-party coalitions at the municipal
level.
19 As early as 2004, the USFP sent a delegation to the PJD’s national party congress. See Wegner, Islamist
Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes.
20 Authors’ interview with a member of the USFP’s political bureau, 29 September 2009. For many, the PJD’s
moderation was shown in its vote for a reform of the personal status code that upgraded the rights of women in the
autumn of 2003, a reform it had vigorously opposed in 1999. However, the PJD’s vote is better explained as a
pragmatic step to display a modern image in the context of the 2003 terrorist attacks. See Wegner, Islamist
Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes.
21 As of yet, the most public expression in favour of a ‘rapprochement’ with the PJD has come from Driss
Lachghar, a member of the USFP’s political bureau, shortly after the 2009 elections in a joint interview with PJD
leader Mustapha Ramid. See O. Brouksy and A. Tafnout, ‘Le Face-a`-Face USFP-PJD’, Le Journal
Hebdomadaire, 18–24 July 2009.
22 Authors’ interview with a USFP municipal councillor, 25 November 2008.
23 Towns with USFP-supported PJD mayors include Chefchaouen, Larache, Te´touan and Kasbat Tadla. Towns
with PJD-supported USFP mayors include Agadir, Rabat and Ourzazate.
24 Authors’ interview with USFP activists, 29 June 2009 and 23 September 2009.
25 Authors’ interview with a member of the USFP’s political bureau, 29 September 2009. Rather
candidly, this USFP leader explained that the respective national leaders had already agreed on coalitions
in several towns. Three middle-sized towns in the North, for example, Te´touan, Chefchaouen and
Larache, were supposed to be governed by the RNI, Istiqlal and the USFP, respectively, following such a
deal.
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The PJD: looking for friends
The PJD emerged in the 1990s out of the Movement for Unity and Reform, itself a
fusion of Islamist organisations.26 After an antagonistic start with the regime in the
1970s, these Islamist organisations had pursued a reformist approach since the
1980s and been striving for electoral participation since the early 1990s.
Eventually, the Islamists first ran in parliamentary elections in 1997. Following a
demand by King Hassan II, they initially participated in the alternance
government (without portfolio), a position they called ‘critical support’, but left
that government after the succession of Mohamed VI to the throne in 1999.27 Even
before officially leaving the government, the Islamists had mobilised against two
key government projects, namely the aforementioned reform of the personal status
code and the introduction of micro-credits in Morocco, which they viewed as
projects of the ‘secular Westernized elites’.28
To its own surprise, the PJD won the third largest number of seats in the 2002
elections, which led to an internal debate on the participation in the next
government. Although the eventual choice for remaining in opposition was
predominantly the result of political support considerations—easier gained and
maintained in opposition—there also existed a current inside the PJD that opposed
joining a USFP-dominated government for ideological reasons. In fact, the
USFP’s participation in government in 2002 was given as the official reason for
the PJD’s decision to remain in opposition.29 The USFP and the PJD had also
clashed during the electoral campaign of 2002, with the PJD engaging in a polemic
about the USFP allowing a representative of the Israeli Labour Party to attend the
Socialist International in Morocco, and the USFP accusing the PJD in turn of using
the mosques for electoral purposes.30
After the 16 May 2003 Islamist terrorist attacks, the PJD came to realise that its
political isolation and lack of allies were a threat to the party, as the attacks were
used by the party’s opponents to mobilise against the PJD. With the threat of a
party ban lingering over its head, the PJD leadership embarked on an image
campaign that included the endorsement of policies it had previously opposed. It
also adopted a highly pragmatic approach towards the building of local
government coalitions after the 2003 municipal elections, and would have indeed
formed such coalitions with the USFP, had the latter accepted them. Whereas in
2003 the PJD tried to open up more generally to other political parties, it started to
seek out closer ties with the USFP from 2007 onwards. Following the 2007
parliamentary elections, in which the PJD had expected, but failed, to win the
largest share of seats, the party concluded that it would not be able, independently,
to reform the political system from within. Since then, the party has multiplied its
‘gestures of courtesy’ towards the USFP, as one of its party leaders put it.31
Considering the USFP the only other relevant programmatic party in the
Moroccan party system, the PJD has been striving to build a pro-democracy
26 For a detailed background analysis on the emergence of the PJD and the Islamist movement organisation
behind it, see Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 See M.J. Willis, ‘Morocco’s Islamists and the Legislative Elections of 2002: The Strange Case of the Party
That Did Not Want to Win’, Mediterranean Politics, 9(1) (2004), pp. 53–81.
31 Authors’ interview with a member of the PJD’s General Secretariat, 20 June 2009.
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coalition with the USFP, a quest which has been largely frustrated by the USFP’s
reluctance to join forces with the Islamists.
Determinants of Opposition Cooperation in Non-democracies
The literature on opposition cooperation in non-democracies is vast, and includes,
but is not limited to, analyses of the formation and success of pre-electoral
alliances, as well as the formation of broader reform coalitions and/or single-issue
coalitions.32 Following the definition provided by Kraetzchmar in the introductory
contribution to this issue, we denote opposition cooperation here as any type of
collective action undertaken by two or more distinct political and/or civil society
forces that is made public (that is, evident to the broader public), yet falls short of a
full merger of the groups in question.
When it comes to the Middle East and North Africa, the key focus in the coalition
literature has thus far been on patterns of Islamist–leftist cooperation, followed by a
number of studies on pre-electoral alliances in authoritarian elections.33 While
electoral alliances are not of particular interest here—largely because it is very
difficult to forge such alliances under the current PR-based system and because the
PJD is advocating the formation of a far broader reform coalition—the literature on
Islamist–leftist cooperation certainly is. Cooperation between Islamists and
leftists/secularists in other Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries,
especially in Jordan and Egypt, has been the topic of several studies. The larger part
of this literature focuses on the potential consequences of this cooperation regarding
democratisation and the moderation of the Islamists, not on the factors influencing
the emergence of cross-party cooperation.34 Some of these studies also use the
depth of cooperation of Islamists with leftists or secularists as an indicator of
Islamist moderation.35 In contrast, this study is not concerned with the systemic or
behavioural consequences of such cooperation, but with the factors that shape the
propensity of party leaders to pursue or reject closer cooperation with organisations
across the ideological divide. In other words, we are interested in factors that can
explain the divergent preferences of PJD and USFP leaders regarding cross-
ideological cooperation.
In this respect, the literature on Islamist–leftist cooperation is more scarce.
Nevertheless, a few factors can be extracted from the literature in the field and will
be evaluated below. The first of these factors is the depth of the ideological divide.
Cavatorta, for instance, concludes in his study of opposition politics in Morocco that
‘the ideological divide between the two sectors of society [leftist and Islamist] is so
32 For a definition and more detailed discussion of these concepts, see the introductory contribution to this issue
by H. Kraetzschmar, ‘Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: From Single-Issue Coalitions to
Transnational Networks’.
33 For contributions on the electoral alliance literature in the Arab world, see for instance H.J. Kraetzschmar,
‘Electoral Rules, Voter Mobilization and the Islamist Landslide in the Saudi Municipal Elections of 2005’,
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 3(4) (2010), pp. 485–502; H.J. Kraetzschmar, ‘Opposition Cooperation in Electoral
Autocracies: The United National Front for Change in Egypt’s 2005 Parliamentary Elections’, in H. Albrecht
(ed.), Contentious Politics in the Middle East (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2010).
34 See J.A. Clark, ‘The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(4) (2006), pp. 539–560; J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation:
Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); C. Wickham, ‘The Path to
Moderation. Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt’s Wasat Party’, Comparative Politics, 36(2)
(2004), pp. 205–228. For Yemen, see M. Browers, ‘Origins and Architects of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Parties’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 39(4) (2007), pp. 565–586.
35 Clark, ‘The Conditions of Islamist Moderation’; Wickham, ‘The Path to Moderation’.
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significant that they fear each other more than they fear the continuation of
authoritarian rule’ and that this was a key factor explaining the ‘absence of formal
coalitions between the two sectors’.36 Differences may range from the role and
rights of women in society and politics to the type of democracy envisioned (liberal
vs. organic). Indeed, USFP leaders themselves argue that it is the religious
underpinning of the PJD’s ideology, standing in stark contrast to the secularist
background of the USFP, which renders any cooperation between the two parties
impossible. However, it remains unclear whether it is the present-day ideological
adversity that would lead the two parties to discard cooperation, or broader fears
regarding the future implementation of policies reflecting the other’s ideology, once
full democracy has been attained.
A second possible factor shaping the prospects for Islamist–leftist cooperation,
and more generally opposition cooperation in non-democracies, is concerns
regarding a party’s expected electoral performance in a democracy. According to
Przeworski, the dilemma that anti-authoritarian forces face in non-democracies is
that they must unite to bring about democracy, but struggle against each other ‘for
the best place’ in a future democratic system.37 Political parties with weak program-
matic support might thus fear democratisation the most, because they would perform
badly in a genuine electoral contest. Note that this factor cannot be disentangled
easily from ideological concerns. A weak political party could abstain from an
alliance with an ideologically opposed, stronger party because it fears that it is the
other party’s programme that will be implemented after democratisation, or because
it fears that it will vanish in a democracy. In any case, strong ideological opposition
should increase the fears of the weaker party and thus its dislike of cooperation.
Finally, scholars working on opposition cooperation have emphasised the
importance of political opportunity structures, mostly the extent of state repression
and co-optation.38 Regarding repression, scholars diverge in their findings
concerning its impact on cross-ideological cooperation. Shehata, for instance,
argues in her study of more than a dozen successful and failed alliance attempts
that repression has prevented cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and
other opposition forces in Egypt. In contrast, cooperation had flourished in
moments of political liberalisation.39 Schwedler also finds that the fear to
‘antagonize the regime’ post 9/11 had made the Jordanian Islamists less inclined to
join forces with other opposition forces.40 At the same time, repression can also
work in the opposite direction and encourage cooperation in two ways. First, it can
encourage cooperation in cases where all opposition groups are excluded or
equally subjugated to regime repression.41 For example, Clark mentions the 1993
36 F. Cavatorta, ‘“Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail”: Opposition Politics in Morocco’, p. 151.
Democratization, 16(1) (2009), pp. 137–156; D. Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt: Opposition, Conflict
and Cooperation (London: Routledge, 2009). For a similar argument regarding ideology, see again Shehata,
Islamists and Secularists in Egypt.
37 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also S.N. Golder, The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2006). Golder finds that asymmetries in electoral strength influence a party’s
willingness to enter an electoral coalition. See also Cavatorta, ‘“Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail”’.
38 Van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games’.
39 Shehata, Islamists and Secularists in Egypt. For the role of political opportunity structures, see also
J. Schwedler, ‘Islamists, Protests, and Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan: Common Interest or Collective
Identity?’, paper presented at the Fifth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme,
24–28 March 2004.
40 Schwedler, ‘Islamists, Protests, and Cross-Ideological Cooperation in Jordan’.
41 Lust-Okar, Structuring Contestation in the Arab World.
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electoral law in Jordan, designed to reduce the share of seats of opposition
parties—not only of the Islamists—as a key factor in the creation of the Higher
Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties, a broad
reform coalition that includes Islamists and various secular parties.42 Second,
repression can lead to cooperation in cases where a particularly repressed
group, usually the Islamists, seeks protection from the state by allying itself
to a legalised political party/group. Abdelrahman, for instance, argues that the
harsh repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt increased their preferences
for cooperation, because they felt ‘the need to work in the shadow of other
groups’.43
In contrast to repression, co-optation unambiguously works to prevent
cooperation. It is a regime strategy to split the political opposition, by offering
state resources to a part of the opposition in exchange for quiescence.44 A political
party that is, for instance, included in a government which may be powerless but
yields dividends from office and access to state funds, might prefer the certainty of
present gains to an unclear future in a democracy. A co-opted political party might
be less inclined to join a pro-democracy coalition or, more generally, to cooperate
with opposition parties for fear of losing the spoils of co-optation.
Following from the above, the remainder of this contribution will explore three
factors that are likely to have shaped the PJD’s and USFP’s preferences regarding
cross-ideological cooperation. These concern: (1) ideological distance; (2)
electoral strength; and (3) the regime’s divide and rule tactics (co-optation and
repression). These factors are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Moreover, given
the data available, the aim is not to isolate the effect of any of these factors, but
rather to use them as a heuristic tool for a study of the PJD’s and USFP’s views of
the costs and benefits of cross-party cooperation.
Making Sense of the PJD’s and USFP’s Preferences for (Non)-Cooperation
This section discusses the diverging preferences of the USFP and PJD regarding
the formation of broader reform coalitions at the national and local levels. It
examines why the PJD leadership has, since 2007, actively sought closer
cooperation with the USFP, while the USFP leadership in turn has shown a
persistent reluctance. In this context, this section also seeks to explore why the
USFP’s local councillors have, in defiance of headquarter directives, cooperated
with the PJD in numerous municipalities across the country after the 2009
municipal elections. The subsequent discussion is structured around the factors
influencing cross-party cooperation spelled out above.
The PJD’s calculus: yes to cooperation with the USFP
The PJD’s declared aim to build a broader reform coalition with the USFP since
2007 is relatively straightforward to understand. In fact, as far as the PJD is
42 Clark, ‘The Conditions of Islamist Moderation’.
43 M. Abdelrahman, ‘From Rivals to Allies? The Left and Political Islam in Egypt’, paper presented at the Fifth
Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme, 24–28 March 2004, p. 18.
44 L.R. Arriola, ‘Patronage and Political Stability in Africa’, Comparative Political Studies, 42(10) (2009), pp.
1339–1362; Lust-Okar, Structuring Contestation in the Arab World; J. Ghandi and A. Przeworksi, ‘Cooperation,
Co-optation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships’, Economics & Politics, 18(1) (2006), pp. 1–26.
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concerned, it is likely to benefit strongly from the pressure for democratisation that
it believes would flow from cooperation with the USFP, while nothing really
stands in the way of closer cooperation. At present, the PJD can count on having
the strongest programmatic electoral support; that is, of voters who are even more
likely to support the party the more their votes matter. Pellicer and Wegner show
that in 2002 and 2007 the PJD was strongest in districts that have a larger share of
educated voters.45 In 2007, in fact, it was the only party whose votes were
positively correlated with literacy, while all other political parties, including the
USFP, were stronger in districts with higher levels of illiteracy.46 The PJD was
also the most successful party in urban areas in the 2009 municipal elections.
Additionally, a large segment of educated voters are currently abstaining. Given
that these are likely to be the most politically conscious, their abstention might be
related to awareness that they are voting for a meaningless parliament. In a
democratic Morocco, these voters would probably re-exert their voting rights. In
view of the PJD’s voter profile, the party would expect to win a large share of these
educated abstentionists.47 In short, the PJD has nothing to fear—and much to
win—from elections in a democratic system that could flow from a successful
political reform coalition.
Second, whilst the PJD is an officially sanctioned player on the Moroccan party
political scene and adheres to the rules pertaining to this inclusion (not to criticise
the monarchy, Islam, or territorial integrity and to generally be moderate in their
advocacy for reforms), it is not co-opted. In contrast to other ‘opposition’ parties in
Morocco (such as the USFP and Istiqlal), the PJD is neither part of the current
government, nor has it been part of previous governments.48 Thus, no spoils from
office would be lost by increasing its opposition visibility in a pro-democracy
coalition with the USFP.
Third, of the included political players in the Moroccan party system, the PJD
has by and large been the recipient of the harshest treatment by the regime.49
Specifically, many efforts have been made to decrease the PJD’s electoral
strength. Until the 2007 elections, the party was forced by the regime to
significantly reduce the number of candidates put forward in elections; in 2003
to as little as 16 per cent of all available seats following the 16 May
terrorist attacks.50 The regime has also used the gerrymandering of district
boundaries to the disadvantage of the PJD, mainly by adding rural villages
to towns in which the party was expected to do well. In 2009, the formation
of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) was announced as an explicit
anti-PJD initiative by the regime and clearly perceived by PJD leaders and local
45 M. Pellicer and E. Wegner, ‘Socio-Economic Voter Profile and Motives for Islamist Support in Morocco’,
Party Politics, forthcoming.
46 Ibid.
47 This idea is also underscored by the famous poll conducted in 2006 by the International Republican Institute in
Morocco. The poll found a 47 per cent vote intention for the PJD, in contrast to only 14 per cent of registered
voters that eventually voted for the party one year later. The finding suggests that Moroccans had a strong
preference for the PJD compared to all other Moroccan parties but ultimately preferred to abstain in the elections,
possibly because they were aware that election results do not matter for policy.
48 The only exception was the period from 1998–1999, when the PJD was part of the alternance government,
following the wishes of King Hassan II. See Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes.
49 The Justice and Charity Organization, which rejects political participation under the current conditions and
refuses to endorse the monarchy’s claim to religious legitimacy, is much more repressed than the PJD. In contrast
to the latter, leaders and members of Justice and Charity are periodically arrested and have allegedly been tortured
in recent arrests.
50 See Wegner, Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes.
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activists as such.51 Although non-existent in the 2007 elections, the PAM has
become the strongest force in parliament as a result of illegal, but in the case of the
PAM, unprosecuted, floor-crossing.52 From the PJD’s perspective, explicit
cooperation with the USFP to denounce such regime interventions in elections
could offer the party greater protection from state repression. This is also
illustrated by the fact that the PJD does not seek formal cooperation with the
banned Islamist Justice and Charity Organization, an alliance that would most
likely make the PJD the target of further repression.53
What, then, about ideology and the extant ideological differences between the
PJD and the USFP? There is indeed a long history of Islamist–leftist clashes in
Morocco, and Islamists have persistently focused on the secular left as their key
political foe. The university campuses of the 1970s and 1980s, where most of the
current PJD elite have been politically socialised, were marked by confrontations
between Islamists and leftists. Indeed, as mentioned above, an important faction
within the PJD did object to joining a government coalition in 2002 which
included the USFP on ideological grounds.
How, then, is it possible that the PJD leadership has recently taken a far more
positive approach to cross-ideological cooperation, as manifest in its eagerness to
ally with the leftist USFP in a broader reform coalition from 2007 onwards?
Essentially, the national party leadership considers the benefits of cooperating
with the USFP to override any potential ideological costs. The PJD leadership
certainly acknowledges that key ideological differences exist between the two
parties and is uncomfortable with the fact that some USFP leaders are ‘very much
to the left’.54 By the same token, however, they also seem to believe that in an
authoritarian system, where programmes cannot be implemented anyhow,
ideology matters far less than in a fully fl-edged democracy. In their view,
ideology is a post-democratisation luxury that should not stand in the way of
opposition cooperation under autocracy to increase pressures for democratic
reforms. As party leader Mustapha Ramid put it in an interview with the Moroccan
newspaper Le Journal:
If Morocco were a democracy, the USFP would have been the USFP, the PJD the PJD. We
have our differences that one cannot deny. [ . . . ] But today, can one say that the parties
implement their programmes [in Morocco]? [ . . . ] Before we can explore issues relating to
our ideological differences, we have to tackle questions relating to our institutions.55
While the position of the PJD leadership towards cooperation with the USFP
has been publicly expressed, no information is available as to how grassroots
activists and their electoral base view such cooperation. Indeed, seeking such
cooperation with the USFP has been a policy of the national PJD leadership,
possibly overriding complaints from local activists. The picture on the ground
seems to suggest, however, that such cooperation is perceived as unproblematic by
local activists and councillors, given that they have formed local government
51 Authors’ interviews with PJD leaders, 20 and 25 June 2009. A PJD activist in Larache also mentioned the PAM
as an explicit motivation to join forces with the USFP.
52 K. Koehler, ‘All the King’s Men: The Emergence of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) in
Morocco’, IPRIS Maghreb Review, October/November 2010, pp. 1–2.
53 For the difficulties of alliances between actors with different inclusion status, see Lust-Okar, Structuring
Contestation in the Arab World.
54 Authors’ interview with a member of the PJD’s General Secretariat, 1 November 2007.
55 Brouksy and Tafnout, ‘Le Face-a`-Face USFP-PJD’. Authors’ translation from French.
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coalitions with the USFP without complaining publicly about it. Perhaps more
importantly, and as will be discussed below, the opinions of PJD and USFP
supporters regarding gender roles or the relationship between religion and politics
turn out to diverge only a little, suggesting that PJD supporters might not even
view cooperation with the USFP as an Islamist sell-out.
In sum, the PJD has a lot to gain and almost nothing to lose by forming a broader
reform coalition with the USFP. It can expect to fare well, if not best, in
democratic elections. In the process, it could overcome its domestic and
international isolation and would cease being the sole target of regime repression
if allied to the USFP. Perhaps the party’s explicit calls for closer cooperation with
the USFP and the actual formation of local coalition governments in numerous
towns since 2009 has cost the PJD a few supporters, disgruntled about allying with
the secularists. But clearly this is considered worth the cost from the leadership’s
point of view.
The USFP’s calculus: no to cooperation with the PJD
This reasoning is clearly not shared by the USFP, whose leadership remains
opposed to cooperation with the PJD, and whose leaders have made every effort in
the past to persuade activists and local councillors on the ground to forge local
government coalitions with parties other than the PJD. According to the USFP
leadership itself, ideological differences are at the heart of its reluctance to
cooperate at any level with the PJD. While the USFP presents itself as the party of
modernity, gender equality and secularism, it considers the PJD as diametrically
opposed to these policy positions.56
Given the importance of ideology in the leadership’s reasoning, this section
begins by analysing the breadth of the ideological divide between the two parties.
It is of course impossible to evaluate precisely how ‘genuine’ the USFP
leadership’s personal distaste of the Islamists’ ideology is, or if it ‘truly’ believes
that cooperation with the Islamists would be impossible to swallow for its
supporters. One can, however, examine the actual breadth of the ideological divide
between supporters of the two parties by comparing their views on sensitive issues,
such as gender roles and the role of religion in politics. Based on the assumption
that the USFP leadership has some knowledge of the attitudes of its supporters, the
breadth of the ideological divide between USFP and PJD supporters allows one to
make inferences of how important their ideological opposition is in the
leadership’s cooperation decisions. To do so, this study draws on the 1999–2004
and 2005–2008 rounds of the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS examines
political, social and cultural attitudes around the world since the 1980s.57 In
Morocco, the survey was carried out in 2001–2002 and in 2007. The sample sizes
for 2001–2002 and 2007 are 2264 and 1200 respondents respectively, and include
individuals over 18 years of age. Questions of the WVS relating to the role of
women in society, the influence religious leaders should have on politics, and
whether it was important that politicians believe in God, can address the typical
ideological disagreements that exist between Islamists and secularists/leftists.
56 Authors’ interviews with USFP leaders, Rabat, 20 and 25 November 2008, and 28–29 September 2009. See
also A. Hamzawy, ‘Interview with Khalid Al-Hariry, Moroccan MP, Socialist Union for Popular Forces (USFP)’,
Arab Reform Bulletin, 18 July 2007.
57 The World Values Survey is available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
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A question of the WVS that asks which party respondents would vote for if there
were elections tomorrow allows us to gauge levels of party political support.
The questions about attitudes considered here were probed for strength of
opinion, offering the following categories of answers: ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’,
‘disagree’ and ‘disagree strongly’. We have merged these categories into a simple
dichotomy of ‘agree’ vs. ‘disagree’.58 As our concern is ideological opposition, we
are not interested in mild differences between USFP and PJD supporters, relating
to ‘agreeing strongly’ vs. ‘agreeing’, but in more substantial differences, as
represented by the categories of ‘agree’ vs. ‘disagree’.
Before proceeding any further, it is important to note that support for the USFP
and PJD changed quite dramatically between these two WVS surveys, so that we
have only 19 PJD supporters in 2001/2002 but 243 in 2007. For the USFP,
meanwhile, we encounter the reverse, with 198 supporters in the 2001/2002
survey, but only 40 in 2007. In spite of this imbalance in the number of
respondents, we have chosen to analyse the 2001/2002 and the 2007 data
separately because the attitudes of Moroccans have changed considerably in the
time between the two surveys.59 The 2001/2002 respondents are more
conservative on many, although not all, issues. For instance, 70 per cent of the
respondents in the 2001/2002 survey agreed strongly that ‘politicians who don’t
believe in God are unfit for office’, whereas this opinion is held by only 35 per cent
of the respondents in 2007. Given that the USFP has many more supporters in the
earlier survey, it would appear in a merged dataset that USFP supporters are
consistently more conservative than PJD supporters. Compared to this, having a
very imbalanced number of PJD and USFP supporters in the two datasets is less
problematic. Moreover, there is an advantage resulting from these changing
patterns of support. The few PJD supporters in the earlier survey are likely to
correspond to more ideological, early supporters, before the PJD gained broader
support, possibly even from former USFP voters protesting against the party’s
sell-out in government. Therefore, ideological differences are more likely to
become apparent in the 2001/2002 WVS dataset.60 Lastly, we also examine the
attitudes of Istiqlal supporters in both surveys and compare them to those of USFP
and PJD supporters. As this party has been the long-term ally of the USFP, the
views of Istiqlal supporters are a good way of testing how much ideological
convergence there has to be for the USFP to form an alliance. For Istiqlal, there are
132 observations in 2001/2002 and 124 in 2007.
Figure 1 illustrates how supporters of the three parties view atheist politicians in
2001/2002 and 2007 respectively. The vertical axis in this and the following
figures shows the percentage of supporters of USFP, Istiqlal, PJD, or ‘others’ (this
includes respondents supporting other Moroccan parties as well as those indicating
that they would abstain) holding a particular opinion. As mentioned above, there is
a striking difference between the two surveys on how Moroccans view atheist
politicians, marked by a significant drop in those agreeing with the statement from
overall 70 to a mere 25 per cent. In spite of this overall drop, USFP and PJD
58 Two of the considered questions also allow for ‘neither agree nor disagree’. We have left this category as it is.
59 To explore the reasons behind the value changes is beyond the scope of this study but would make a fascinating
topic for further investigation.
60 Who the 2007 USFP supporters are is much less clear. They could have been both core supporters who follow
their party even through difficult stretches, and voters who do not care much about the party’s programme and
support it for other reasons, such as clientelist ones.
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supporters in the same survey hold rather similar opinions on this point. Having
said so, of the two groups of respondents, USFP supporters appear overall more
tolerant towards atheist politicians than PJD supporters. ‘Only’ 85 per cent of
USFP supporters believe that such politicians are unfit for office in 2001/2002,
compared to 95 per cent of PJD supporters. In 2007, this figure dropped
significantly for supporters of both parties. However, the decrease is larger for
USFP supporters (to 32 per cent) compared to almost 50 per cent of PJD
supporters. These differences are, however, not large enough to point at a
polarised pool of supporters for the two parties, given that 40 per cent of PJD
supporters also disagree with the statement. It is also noteworthy that even more
Istiqlal supporters (around 60 per cent) than PJD supporters agree in 2007 that
politicians who do not believe in God should not hold office.
Figure 2 displays the views of Moroccans regarding the influence of religious
leaders on voting choices. In this case, respondents in 2007 have become overall
more permissive. Less than 40 per cent agree with the statement that ‘religious
leaders should not influence how people vote’, compared to around 75 per cent in
2001/2002. Again, in both surveys there is virtually no difference between USFP
and PJD respondents when it comes to allowing (i.e., ‘disagree’) religious leaders
an influence on voting choices (12 per cent USFP and 12.5 per cent PJD in
2001/2002; 29 per cent USFP and 31.5 per cent PJD in 2007). It is also noteworthy
Figure 1. Politicians Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Office. Source: The World Values
Survey, available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
Figure 2. Religious Leaders Should Not Influence How People Vote. Source: The World Values
Survey, available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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that in both surveys a majority of both parties’ supporters feel that religious leaders
should not influence voting.61 In short, according to these survey data there does
not appear to be any significant discrepancy between supporters of the two parties
regarding the impact religious leaders should have on a crucial aspect of political
rights.
On the issue of gender roles, the survey data highlight respondent positions on
the following three issues: (1) whether being a housewife is fulfilling for a woman;
(2) whether men make better political leaders; and (3) whether university
education is more important for a boy than a girl. All three positions indicate to
what extent respondents see an equal role for women in public life, a topic that
should be—and is, according to the USFP leadership—a key issue dividing
Islamists and leftists.
Figure 3 shows the views of Moroccans on whether being a housewife is
fulfilling. In 2001/2002, around 65 per cent agreed that being a housewife was
fulfilling, while in 2007 this figure stands at 58 per cent. Again, the differences
between USFP and PJD supporters are negligible. In 2001/2002, there is almost no
difference between the two, with 62 per cent of USFP supporters and 58 per cent of
PJD supporters agreeing that the life of a housewife was fulfilling. Istiqlal
supporters and those of other parties appear slightly more conservative on this
issue. In 2007, PJD supporters appear by contrast clearly more conservative than
USFP supporters, with around 56 per cent viewing the life of a housewife as
fulfilling, compared to only 40 per cent of USFP supporters. However, the views
of PJD supporters are similar to those of supporters of Istiqlal and other parties.
Also noteworthy is the fact that 40 per cent of PJD supporters do not agree with the
statement. In short, the views of PJD supporters appear to be rather standard
Moroccan views on this issue.
Figure 4 details the respondents’ views regarding leadership abilities relating to
gender. Again, there is virtually no difference between USFP and PJD supporters
in the 2001/2002 survey, with around 63 per cent of both sets of respondents
agreeing that men make better political leaders. According to the 2007 survey
data, the views of USFP supporters have changed on this topic, with the figure of
Figure 3. Being a Housewife Is Fulfilling. Source: The World Values Survey, available online at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
61 This also applies to Istiqlal supporters in both surveys, and even more strongly so than is the case for USFP and
PJD supporters.
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those agreeing with the statement dropping to less than 50 per cent, while the
views of PJD supporters remain almost unchanged. Nevertheless, their views are
still more aligned than not. It is also noteworthy that in both surveys the most
conservative of all respondents are Istiqlal supporters, of whom in 2001/2002
more than 80 per cent believed in the superior leadership abilities of men.
Figure 5, lastly, highlights whether respondents consider university education to
be more important for boys than for girls. While USFP supporters consistently
disagree to a larger extent with this statement than PJD supporters in both
2001/2002 and 2007 (75 per cent compared to 62 per cent, and 82 per cent
compared to 79 per cent, respectively), the differences are not overwhelming.
Moreover, although PJD supporters hold more conservative views than USFP
supporters on this issue, it is noteworthy that they are more progressive than the
supporters of other parties in both surveys, and especially compared to those views
held by Istiqlal supporters.
In sum, the WVS survey data for Morocco do not reveal any major ideological
polarisation between supporters of Islamists and leftists. Overall, PJD supporters
appear more conservative than USFP supporters, but to a relatively small degree;
Figure 4. Men Make Better Political Leaders. Source: The World Values Survey, available online at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
Figure 5. University Education Is More Important for Boys than Girls. Source: The World Values
Survey, available online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org
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for the most part the difference is less than 10 per cent. In fact, the views of USFP
supporters do not appear to be as ‘secular’ and ‘gender equal’ as posited by the
USFP leadership in the first place. Additionally, both types of supporters are often
more progressive than those of other political parties and, importantly, those of
Istiqlal, the USFP’s longstanding ally and partner in national government since
1998. From the point of view of their supporters, ideological discrepancies are
only minor and thus seemingly constitute no serious impediment to cross-party
cooperation between the USFP and the PJD. Although supporters are not identical
to party activists, the fact that local councillors defended the formation of local
government coalitions with the PJD vis-a`-vis their national leadership seems to
suggest that their views are not different from those held by ordinary party
supporters. As a USFP councillor in a coalition with the PJD put it, for him the PJD
mayor is just the person owning the grocery shop, that is, a common citizen.62
Unless it is the ideological aversion of national USFP leaders themselves that
makes them discard any form of cooperation with the PJD, our findings suggest
that reasons other than ideology must be involved in the party leadership’s
objection to any form of cross-party cooperation.
What, then, are these reasons? Since entering the alternance government in
1998, the USFP has experienced a rather dramatic decline in its electoral support.
It won 884,061 votes in 1997 (the largest number of all parties). In 2002, this
number had decreased to 685,710 and by 2007 the number of votes received had
fallen to less than half its 1997 total (408,945). Additionally, its support has
become stronger in districts with high rates of illiteracy, suggesting that
clientelistic linkages are becoming increasingly relevant for USFP voters. Pellicer
and Wegner show that, for 2002, there was a negative correlation of USFP votes
with illiteracy, whereas in 2007 that correlation had become positive.63
Additionally, USFP support in 2007 had a relatively high correlation with
turnout. In Morocco, this is another indicator of clientelistic voting. Although the
USFP could perhaps recuperate part of its previous electoral base in democratic
elections, USFP activists are painfully aware of the fact that they were once the
party of the urban and educated—where programmatic voting is more
prominent—but that this has now become the characteristic of the PJD.64 The
authors of this study thus suggest that weakening electoral support, and in
particular its decreasing programmatic support, might be a relevant factor behind
the USFP’s avoidance of any cooperation with the PJD in a broader reform
coalition. This implies, of course, that the USFP leadership’s commitment to
democratic change has become rather ambiguous.
USFP activists and local councillors appeared much more determined to fight
their decrease in credibility and electoral strength than the national leadership. For
instance, activists argued that leaving previous local government coalitions (such
as with the Istiqlal and the RNI) and entering new ones with the PJD was a way of
recuperating credibility in the eyes of the Moroccan electorate and hence their
share of votes. This discrepancy in attitudes towards cross-party cooperation with
the PJD between party leadership and activists is likely related to the USFP’s co-
optation into government, which since the late 1990s has yielded benefits to
national leaders and MPs, but not to party activists at the local level. Participation
62 Authors’ interview with a USFP activist, 29 June 2009.
63 Pellicer and Wegner, ‘Socio-economic Voter Profile’.
64 Authors’ interview with a USFP activist, 29 June 2009.
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in and leadership of the alternance government from 1998 to 2002 was certainly
motivated by the hope to advance political and economic reforms. The alternance
government has, however, performed far below expectations on this front and the
USFP joined subsequent coalition governments, in which it played an increasingly
insignificant role. Moreover, the first of these governments (2002–2007) was led
by Driss Jettou, a ‘non-partisan’ appointee of King Mohamed VI, and a violation
of a just-established practice—the appointment of the leader of the strongest party
as Prime Minister—in the context of political liberalisation.65 Since then, the party
has hung on to cabinet participation, in spite of its dramatic electoral decline and
increasing violations of press freedom and human rights. These factors suggest
that the USFP remains in government not exactly for programmatic reasons. Given
that pro-democracy cooperation with the Islamists would require the USFP’s
departure from government, the national leadership’s opposition to such
cooperation is likely to be linked to its attachment to office.66 In short, the
current status of non-cooperation carries, from the USFP leadership’s point of
view, secure gains—that is, retention of the spoils of government—whereas it is
far from certain what the gains would be for the party if it entered into a broader
coalition with the PJD. In fact, not only is such cooperation likely to cost the USFP
its position in government, but it could expose the party to renewed government
repression, something the USFP is currently not a particular target of.
In sum, entering a reform coalition with the PJD would entail, from the USFP
leadership’s point of view, obvious costs and rather uncertain benefits. The costs
consist of a most certain loss of the spoils of co-optation currently available to the
party leadership, the potential of renewed state repression, and possibly even a loss
of significance in a successful democratisation process. Following the analysis of
the profiles of USFP and PJD supporters, an ideological sell-out does not appear to
be among the costs, despite being advanced by the USFP leadership as the prime
reason for its reluctance to cooperate with the PJD. What is more, none of these
costs seem to weigh up against the—albeit uncertain—benefits of any USFP–PDJ
cooperation. These benefits consist of a potential to more effectively pressure the
government into pursuing further democratising reforms by laying bare the lack of
real freedoms and by tarnishing its carefully constructed image as a reforming
regime, and in so doing improving the prospects of the USFP to recuperate some
of its credibility as a meaningful opposition party within the broader Moroccan
society.
Concluding Remarks
This contribution has argued that ideology is a less important factor in determining
cooperation choices between Islamists and leftists in Morocco than is widely
assumed in the literature. From the point of view of the PJD leadership, the
benefits of forging a broader reform coalition with the USFP are so substantial that
the leadership is willing to overlook for the time being whatever ideological
differences there are. From the point of view of the USFP leadership, the costs of
65 In 2002, this would have been the USFP’s leader.
66 A good example is Driss Lachgar, the USFP leader who had been advocating a rapprochement with the
Islamists since 2007. Lachgar later dropped the issue and mentioned commonalities between the USFP and PAM,
after being appointed Minister of Parliamentary Relations. See M. Monjib, ‘The USFP and the Moroccan
Monarchy: The Power of Patronage’, Arab Reform Bulletin, 4 May 2010.
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any cross-party cooperation with the Islamists are perceived to be so high that
ideological differences appear as a good pretext to hold on to their current
government coalition with Istiqlal, whose supporters, ironically, are generally
more conservative than those of the PJD. That ideology appears to be used as a
pretext by USFP leaders, rather than the key reason behind their unwillingness to
ally with the PJD, is also suggested by the fact that local USFP activists and
councillors have been perfectly content to enter municipal government coalitions
with the PJD across the kingdom.
The asymmetry in electoral strength and differences in the type of electoral
support the two parties enjoy appear to hold far greater explanatory power for why
the USFP and PJD differ so dramatically in their coalition-building preferences.
For the PJD, its superior electoral support and the higher degree of programmatic
support lead it to expect higher voter mobilisation in democratic elections, while
for the USFP the contrary seems to hold true. Ultimately, however, it is the
USFP’s co-optation that seems to be the most important driver behind its
reluctance to ally with the Islamists. Such a reform coalition in Morocco would
require the abandoning of the USFP’s cabinet posts, a step for which the party’s
leadership does not appear to be ready.
Perhaps, however, the prospects for the emergence of a new reform coalition
between the USFP and the PJD in Morocco are not so bleak after all. With the fall
of other Middle Eastern and North African autocracies and an increase in street
protests in Morocco, an alliance with the Islamists and a programmatic renewal of
the party in opposition might eventually become more appealing to the USFP
leadership. Indeed, Van de Walle argues that the likelihood of sustained
opposition cooperation increases with the likelihood of a transition.67 As the
regime appears weak(er), it makes sense for the country’s opposition forces (and
even the co-opted opposition) to reassess their position and consider joint action in
support of democratic reforms.68 Although the constitutional reforms recently
announced by King Mohammed VI are of a defensive nature, and not intended to
produce a democratisation of the political system, their mere existence suggests
that the space for genuine reforms, and thus the potential benefits of opposition
cooperation, have increased.
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